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NOTICE
This report describes the results of one phase of
research sponsored by the Southern California Gas Company.
The research was made possible by grant dumber PTP75-03457
from the National Science Foundation to the Southern
California Gas Company. Any opinions, findings, conclu-
sions or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect :he
views of the Southern California Gas Company.
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FOR L14ORD
This report covers work done in late 1974 through 1976. It is
submitted as part of the formal documentation of Project SAGE. The
reader should recognize that much work has been done since the end of
the period covered, and that the results presented here do not reflect
that additi)nal work. For further information regarding this report,
please contact R. E. Bartera, at Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak
Grove Drive, Pasadena, California, 91103.
ABSTRACT
This report recognizes that use of solar energy to stretch our
supplies of fossil fuels is to this Nations' benefit. Project SAGE,
sponsored in part by the Southern California Gas Company addresses
itself to one application of this goal: solar assistance in central
water heating systems for multifamily project.
Public policy issues that can affect the rate of adoption of
solar energy systems are investigated and policy actions are offered to
accelerate the adoption of SAGE and other solar energy systems.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
It is in the national interest to promote the use of solar energy
as a means of stretching our supplies of valuable fossil fuels. Project
SAGE, developed in recognition of this goal, addresses one application
of solar energy: central water heating systems for multifamily projects.
Sponsored in part by the Southern California Gas Company, the project
investigates specifically the potential for such systems in that
company's service territory. Nevertheless, its findings may be appli-
cable to other solar energy uses and to other geographic areas. Cer-
tainly the public policy issues considered in this report are of general
application.
Public policies can affect the rate of adoption of solar energy
systems both positively and negatively. This report examines both kinds
of effects and suggests certain specific policy actions that may serve
to accelerate the adoption of SAGE and other solar energy systems.
1-1
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SECTION II
BARRIERS TO THE ADOPTION OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS
The barriers that presently tend to limit the adoption of solar
energy systems can be classified as technical, economic, and institu-
tional. In the case of SAGE systems, the technical barriers are few
and are discussed elsewhere. The economic barriers to be discussed are:
(1) Gas and electric rate regulation policies
(2) High first cost of solar energy systems
(3) Unfamiliarity of lenders with solar energy systems
(4) Property tax treatment of solar energy systems
(5) Financial risk perceived by builders in incorporating solar
energy systems
Institutional barriers (not always clearly separable from
economic barriers) to be discussed are:
(1) The fragmented nature of the building industry
(2) The associated "information cost" of acquiring a new
technology
(3) Inertia on the part of the building industry and the general
public
(4) Potential legal obstacles in the form of building codes and
deed restrictions
(5) The uncertain status of "sun rights" of property owners.
Solar water heating is a simple and efficient application for
solar energy, and can be shown to be economically competitive on a life-
cycle cost basis with electricity and with the more expensive proposed
techniques for producing synthetic natural gas. The competitive picture
is clouded, however, by the current regulatory policies for natural gas
pricing which generally require average or "rolled-in" pricing of gas
rather than a price that reflects the marginal cost of new gas supplies.
The net result is that the average "rational consumer" compares
the costs of solar and conventional water heating systems and finds that
the conventional system is the best bargain. He may reach this conclu-
sion even if he uses life-cycle costs that compensate for the higher
Initial cost of solar installations with the lower operating costs. If
this analysis shows little difference, he is likely to opt for the con-
ventional system because of the uncertainties associated with a 15- to
20-year payback period. Gas price increases may be seen as inevitable,
2-1	 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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but the amount and timing of the increases are not predictable. In the
case of apartment building owners, the increases can be passed along to
tenants when they occur, while the cost of the solar installation must
be incorporated in rent charges from the beginning.
Solar installations will always have a higher first cost, but the
calculation of payback period depends on the cost of the alternative.
If gas is F '-ed at the cost of new gas supplies, the payback period for
the solar system will be shorter and it will therefore be more attrac-
tive. As an example, some new natural gas supplies such as gasified
coal or imported liquefied natural gas are projected to cost up to $5
per thousand ft 3 . This translates into $10 per million Btu delivered
to the consumer (for distribution charges of $1 per thousand ft 3 and 60%
efficient usage). The cost of solar water heating delivered to the con-
sumer is about $8 per million Btu (with an 8% loan and 20-year life).
Oil 	 basis the rational consumer would choose solar water heating,
but this is not the basis of choice at present because of the regulation
of natural gas prices.
Using the same figures for "rolled-in" gas pricing and assuming
that 5% of the gas supplv is from a "new" high-cost source, we find the
consumer paying $2.85 per million Btu !with existing supplies at $1.50
per mcf and calculating the price of 1 00 mcf on the rolled-in basis).
'rhus even with widely varying assumptions, gas priced on a rolled-in
hasis will almost certainly appear a better bargain than solar water
heating. This pricing policy essentially insulates the consumer from
the true cost of new gas supplies and constitutes an unfair but effec-
tive barrier to the adoption of solar water heating.
The high first-cost of solar installations generally implies loan
financing of such installations. This leads to another economic bar-
rier, since lenders are unfamiliar with solar energy systems. They have
not had enough experience to permit a sound assessment of the risk, with
the result that they are reluctant to make such loans.
The tax treatment of solar equipment can also be an economic bar-
rier. Solar water heating equipment for example is much more expensive
than conventional water heating devices, and if this added cost is
included in the value of the building, the property taxes will be higher
accordingly. nie tax laws have no provisions for reflecting life-cycle
costs, and such tax treatment can serve as an added disincentive to
potential purchasers of solar systems.
Other barriers to widespread adoption of solar energy systems
are class-d as institutional barriers. The natural tendency to avoid
risk is in part an institutional barrier and in part, as noted above, an
economic one. Developers and builders must avoid risk whenever- they
car., since they are working with borrowed funds and schedule delays can
produce large losses. Frequently they will not even consider using
innovations that reduce first cost (much less life-cycle costs); they
prefer to stay with technologies that they know will work and let others
2-2
77-47
do the pioneering. In effect, each builder has an incentive to let some
other builder adupt solar energy first, with the result that there are
long delays in the use of even the best innovations.
A major institutionr.l_ barrier to rapid adoption of new technolo-
gies such as solar energy sys-ems is related to the nature of the con-
struction industry. It is a highly fragmented and regional industry,
with no dominant, large-scale producers such as are common in other
industries. Of the 300,000 builders in the United States, 90% produce
less than 100 units per year and the largest produces less than 1% of
the annual total. There is a high degree of horizontal stratification;
any given construction project is actually implemented by a dozen or
more individual subcontractors or suppliers, from the architect to the
lathing subcontractor, each of whom i5 autonomous and not a part of the
builder's organization.
All of these vertical and horizontal elements of the construction
industry have, over the years, evolved a satisfactory and generally
efficient way of working, but few of their procedures are formal or
written. They are comparable to a body of unwritten l aws or customs.
This type of organization inherently has a large amount of inertia and
resistance to innovation and new technologies are adopted only
gradually.
Part of the reason for this inertia is the "information cost" of
adopting new technologies. Information on commonly used types of equip-
ment is widely available, generally in the form of manufacturers' or
suppliers' catalogs and specification sheets, handbooks, and similar
reference material. There is a cost at every level for building this
kind of information base for a new technology, plus a cost associated
with the process of familiarization. In a highly competitive industry
like construction, there is a tendency to avoid these information costs
as long as possible, in the hope that they will be incurred by some
other element of the industry.
In addition to the inertia inherent in the construction industry,
there is a similar inertia on the part of the general public. Indi-
viduals tend to prefer to wait until others have gone first, thereby
reducing the perceived risk associated with a new technology. Studies
by Griliches, Mansfield, Hagerstrand and others (References 2-1, - 2-3),
have yielded analytical models of the adoption process. Methods have
been developed for estimating the time lag between invention and innova-
t'on (the first application of an invention), but the results are quite
sensitive to the assumptions made. Mansfield (Reference 2-2), for
example, identifies four principal factors that seem to govern the rate
of innovation: 1) its economic advantage; 2) the uncertainty of realiz-
ing that advantage; 3) the required investment; and 4) the rate of
reduction of the initial uncertainty.
ORIGIN AR ^U A I.^y
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Another study examine; the differences in the willingness of
people to try a new product or service. Rogers and Shoemaker (Refer-
Once 2-4) developed a classifscatlon scheme based on this character-
istic of "innovativeness" of consumers. Adopters are divided Into
five categories:
(1) Innovators (the first 2.5%)
(2) Early adopters (the next 13.5%)
(3) Early majority (the next 347)
(4) Late majority (the next 34%)
(5) Laggards (the last 167.)
Naturally these schemes include economic as well as cultural fac-
tors. Mansfield's two economic criteria are payback period and size of
initial investment. In general, customers require relatively stringent
payback criteria before buying a new product. A 10-year payback period
seems reasonable for an early adopter, and a 5-7 year period for the
early majority or a 3-year period for the late majority. The innovators
and the laggards are probably not classifiable on the basis of payback
period, since their decisions arc based on more complex personal vari-
ables. Although these figures are intended to be general in their
F	
application to any new product or service, they may also be applicable
to home buvers or builder/developers. The turnover rate of homes is
such that few buyers retain ownership for periods much greater than
those indicated, and builder/developers of apartment buildings fre-
quently do not plan on retaining ownership for the 20 years assumed in
most life-cycle cost analyses.
Another category of institutional harricrs consists of legal ques-
tions. There is constderabi- uncertainty at present as to how solar
energy systems will be treated in building codes, since few codes have
any provisions for such systems. Also, there are in many areas deed
restrictions (known as covenants, conditions, and restrictions) that
limit choices o.` architectural features. Where solar collectors are
incorporated in the architecture (especially in retrofit installations),
these provisions may limit their adoption.
A final legal issue that is causing concern is that of "sun
rights." The rfght of property owners to have access to sunlight is
not guaranteed under existing laws and p recedents, although there have
been some Initial efforts in this direction. This factor can add to
the uncertainties associated with solar energy systems, although its
effect is not clear at present. Or p opinion (T. Thomas of the American
Bar Association) is that continued uncertainty regarding sun rights
could eventually pose serious difficulties for the use of solar energy.
1
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Two states have addressed this problem. A 1975 Oregon law
req ,iires that access to solar energy be considered in land use plans,
specifically with respect to height and setback requirements. Colorado
has given sour easement legal standing in that state. Other proposals
are for a transferable solar right (Harris of the Rand Corporation) and
three-dimensional zoning (Schoen and Hirshbc-g, JPL). Until more
experience has been gained, there is no obvious choice among the
proposals.
t!
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SECTION TII
POLICIES TO REDUCE BARRIERS TO THE ADOPTION OF
SOLAR ENERGY
Public policies can have the effect of reducing many of the
barriers to adoption of solar energy systems. This section will review
the policies that have been suggested or implemented to achieve this
result.
As noted, public policies do not in general affect the technical
issues of solar energy; a major exception is the extensive program of
research, development, and demonstration being carried on by the federal
government. The results of this program can be expected not only to
provide needed technical advancements and information, but to influence
many of the economic and institutional decisions affecting the rate of
adoption of solar energy systems.
Current gas pricing policies, particularly the requirement for
rolled-in pricing of new natural gas supplies, have been identified as
distorting the competitive economics of solar versus gas heating. This
requirement is the result of public policies, and the simplest means of
eliminating the distortion would be to deregulate gas prices completely.
Alternately, utilities could be allowed to price gas at the marginal
cost of new gas supplies. Either change would result in a rapid rise
in the cost of gas and is probably not politically feasible. In addi-
tion, such a policy adopted in one state could have negative economic
effects. If California, for example, adopted c pricing policy that
reflected the realistic cost of gas it would probably lose industry and
jobs to states that maintained the current policy. Current federal
initiatives may eliminate this problem and at the same time allow gas
prices to rise, gradually, to a more realistic level.
Another policy that has been suggested would require that the
environmental costs associated with the use of fossil fuels be incorpo-
rated in their prices. These are real "social" costs that are not now
reflected in the prices of fossil fuels and further distort the compari-
son with solar energy (which has little or no effect on the etiviron-
ment). Mechanisms for incorporating these environmental costs have
been proposed (Reference 3-1), but implementation would probably be dif-
ficult. In any case, natural gas has less affect on the environment
than do other fossil fuels and prices might not be significantly
affected.
I'The problems associated with life-cycle costing, particularly the
reluctance of decision maker s to base their decisions on this type of
I analysis, have been mentioned. It has been suggested that builders
might be required to make such an analysis and to select the system
With she lowest life-cycle costs. The advantage would be that solar
energy would not be required where it was not feasible or economically
i	 sound; the disadvantage is that such a policy would meet with resistance
and could easily be circumvented by appropriate manipulation of the
figures.
I
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The reluctance of lenders to make loans on solar equipment is
based, as previously noted, on the lack of a basis of experience with
Such equipment. 'Those policies which lead to the acquisition of more
operating experience with solar systems and to the dissemination of the
results of that experience should help to reduce this barrier. These
policies are discussed later.
It has been proposed that the disadvantage of solar energy sye•tems
with respect to property taxes could be eliminated by providing a tax
exemption for such s ystems. While the actual amount of the incentive
would probably not swing a decision, its existence woulu indicate a
recognition on the part of legislators that the use of solar energy is
In the public interest. Associated re^ ,enue loss would not be signifi-
cant, and it appears that this type of incentive should be easy to
adopt.
Several types of financial incentives are frequently suggested to
reduce the first-cost disadvantage of solar ,stems. Reducing the first
cost can make solar systems more economically competitive with conven-
tional systems without the requirement for life-cycle costing and
unacceptably long payback periods. The tax incentives that have been
proposed (over 100 pieces of legislation to promote solar energy have
been introduced in 32 state legislatures) are tax abatements, tax
credits, and low-interest loans.
The property tax exemption affects the continuing cost more than
the initial cost. The other type of tax abatement proposed is the
exemp tion of solar equipment from state sales tax. The first-cost
red , ion of 6"G (i.n California) would probably not be a determining
fac.	 but would provide some encouragement and again indicate the
interest of the legislature in promoting the use of solar energy.
Tax credits are a more significant factor affecting the initial
cost of solar systems. 'Those proposed usually provide for a direct
reduction of income tax up to some percentage of the total initial
investment in a solar system, with a maximum dollar ceiling. For busi-
ness firms, the incentive may be in the form of accelerated deprecia-
tion. A typical bill, HR 6860 of 1975, allowed a reduction of income
tax b y 257, of the cost of a solar system, with a maximum deduction of
$2000. Commercial builders could choose either all 	 tax credit
of 10% or a 5-year depreciation schedule.
Tax incentives are generally intended to speed the rate of adop-
tion of solar energy systems to the point where mass production is pos-
sible, with resulting sharply lower costs. For this reason, they
usuall y hive an expiration date; the bill mentioned previously had a
scheduled expiration date of January 1, 1981.
Low-interest loans provide for rublic subsidy of the difference
between the prevailing interest rate and a lower rate which would make
solar systems more attractive. In the case of it 	 loan, a 5% rate
3-2
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will produce an equivalent first-cost reduction of about 30% if the
prevailing rate is 8%, and 507, if the prevailing rate is 10%. These are
large enough incentives to influence a decision to adopt solar energy.
Certain problems shoulLi be taken into account in evaluating policy
incentives to the adoption of solar energy. First, although it seems to
be generally agreed that "solar energy is good," it is not clear how its
advantages can be weighed in dollar terms. Its environmental advantages
are not well quantified, and the factor of reducing dependence on
foreign oil also has a value difficult to establish in dollar terms at
the individual and local levels. A state legislature can hardly justify
a large revenue loss on this basis.
Secondly, strong incentives will distort the marketplace and
reduce the incentive for improving solar technology. Also, it is not
wise public policy to encourage the use of any energy system that is
more costly than the alternatives and may not work as well as expected.
Third, the incentive itself might slow down the adoption of the
technology making people wait for the enactment of incentive legislation
when they might otherwise have invested in a solar system, particularly
since the legislative process is typic • .zlly long. Retroactive provisions
in proposed legislation could help eliminate this disincentive.
Most of the institutional barriers discussed in the previous sec-
tion are associated in some way with the scarcity of information on the
real performance and cost characteristics of solar energy systems.
Generating and disseminating such information would be an effective
means of reducing those barriers. In particular, the actual or per-
ceived risk that deters lenders, the construction industry, and indi-
viduals is a natural result of the uncertainties consequent on this lack
of information. The "information cost" incurred by members of the con-
struction industry could be reduced by an active program of disseminat-
ing appropriate technical and performance data in forms customarily used
in the industry.
The federal program (primarily ERDA) of solar energy research,
development, and demonstration is a continuing source of the kinds of
information that are needed. It has not yet developed answers to all
the questions that must be answered before solar energy reaches full
commercial status, but it is moving toward that goal. Results of the
demonstration programs are of particular importance in the context con-
sidered here. Similar demonstrations are being carried out by other
agencies and by individual utilities. In all cases, the results are of
value only when they have reached those who can put them into commercial
practice.
Information dissemination policies are of two types: active and
passive. Passive muLhods are generally data banks or clearinghouses
that collect the information and make it available. Active methods take
action to provide the information to potential users. The drawback of
passive methods is that those who need the information must know that
the data source exists, what it contains, and how to obtain and use it.
^	 P p,GE IS
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Active dissemination of solar energy information will probably
reyuirr some intermediary between the sources of information and the
users to help translate solar energy technical information into terms
	 r
that are understandable to builders, subcontractors, and potential
users. There is also a need to monitor and report problems that users
encounter in their application of solar energy and provide these reports
to members of the solar technology community to guide their continuing
research and development efforts.
The concept of Guch an intermediary, combined with a capability
for independent project evaluation and policy anal ysis, has been
investigated b y the author under a grant from the National Science
Foundation. In that study it was characterized as an Implementation
Center, with the objective of reducing the real and perceived risks
associated with solar energy installations (Reference 3-2).
The effect of such an active dissemination program would be to
reduce both the risk factor slowing the adoption of solar energy and
the information costs incurred b y builders and subcontractors undertak-
ing solar energy installations.
Potential legal restraints on solar energy in the form of building
code provisions and deed restrictions are not expected to be a major
impediment in the long run, but may cause local problems for a time
before solar energy technology becomes incorporated into normal
architectural and building practice. The sun rights issue may be
troublesome in individual cases until legal precedents are established
to regulate this aspect of solar energy.
Table 3-1 summarizes the above discussion of possible policies
and their effects on the development of solar energy systems.
3-4
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SECTION IV
POTENTIAL RESULTS OF SOLAR ENERGY POLICIES
The major objective of encouraging use of solar energy through
public policies is to displace some fraction of the energy now provided
in the form of fossil fuels, particularly gas in the case of Project
SAGE. If current projections of the energy future prove accurate, the
displacement will eventually take place with or without policies to
•	 encourage it; however, the process is likely to take longer than is con-
sistent with national objectives if there are no policy incentives.
I&ile it Ls not possible to quantify the effect of an active dis-
semination program for solar technology information, it is reasonable
to suppose that it would speed the evolution of a truly commercial
solar industry. Once the industry is established, the price of solar
collectors (the most expensive and technically risky element of a solar
energy system) may decline dramatically and tip the economic balance in
favor of solar energy (especially if fossil fuels continue to advance in
price as expected). However, the development of the necessary large
demand is hindered by the current high price due to the low level of
demand. The objective of a program of policy incentives is to break
this vicious circle and prime the pump of demand by artificial (i.e.,
non-market) forces.
Studies by JPL indicate that a collector price of $3/ft 2 (in 1974
fM	 dollars, FOB the factory) is reasonable for an efficient, advanced all-
glass collector with selective absorber, given a production of several
million square feet of collector per year. Adding installation costs
and reasonable overhead and profit, the estimated equilibrium price of
collectors could be something over $5/ft 2 . Collector area is the most
important unknorm in solar installation cost since it is currently
uncertain and the largest cost over and above the cost of a conven-
tional installation. The other elements of a solar installation
(storage tanks, pumps, insulation, etc.) are current articles of com-
merce with well-defined costs.
A method has been developed at .1PL for estimating the incentives
necessary to bring collector costs from their current values down to
the desired $5/ft 2 for economic competitiveness ail mass production.
Some typical results are shown in Figure 4-1 for systems of varying
collector area over the range required for single-family residential
water and space heating to smaller multiple-family units.
The current installed price of solar collectors is roughly
S15/ft 2 . From the curve it can be seen that incentives in the range of
35 to 55% on the total installed system cost can reduce that cost to the
equivalent of the desired $5/ft 2 , simulating the effect of a mature
solar industry. This provide a qualitative indication of the range of
incentives necessary to bring about commercial production rates; as
noted earlier, such incentives should be phased out as commercializa-
tion is achieved.
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A second way of estimating reasonable incentive levels is to
determine the conventional energy displacement effect of different
incentive levels and select a level which seems optimal from the cost/
benefit point of view. Figure 4-2 shows the results of this analysis,
assuming no incentive, a 257 incentive, and a 50% incentive. The
vertical scale (logarithmic) indicates the energy displaced by solar
energy and total energy consumption (top dashed curve). The lower
dashed curves are plotted to indicate the percentages of total energy.
This form of presentation enables us to determine the accelerating
effect of the various incentives. For example, 107 of the total energy
demand is displaced by solar in 1985 with a 507 incentive, by 1993 with
a 25% incentive, and Dy 2000 with no incentive (intersections of the
three solid curves with the 107 dashed curve). Thus the 50% incentive
"buys" a 15 year earlier penetration to the 107 level and the 257
incentive a 7 year earlier penetration. Or, we see that in 1990 there
is less than 17 displacement with no incentive, 87 with the 257 incen-
tive, and 137 with the 507 incentive.
In practice, it will probably be most cost effective to use some
combination of incentives, in effect an incentive "package" that would
bring about the desired result at optimum cost. An analytical technique
developed at JPL makes it possible to compute the effect of such com-
binations of tax incentives and low-interest loans and express the
result as an equivalent percentage incentive. One interesting combina-
tion, for example, is a low-interest loan at 67 for 20 years plus a
25% tax credit. This provides the equivalent of a 507 tax incentive
(assuming commercial interest rate of 107 and a rational consumer), but
is probably more acceptable politically. The incentive package could be
gradually scaled down by terminating the low-interest loan portion in
1980, reducing the tax incentive portion to 107 in 1985, and terminating
the entire program in 1990. It could be expected that the prospect of
reduction and termination of the incentives would provide a strong
motive for early adoption of solar systems.
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